Uranium mining and exports

The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will be much easier and faster to achieve and sustain in a world in which nuclear power generation is being phased out. This is because the material and capacity to produce nuclear power is intrinsically linked to the capacity to produce fissile material usable for nuclear weapons. The body of evidence on the proliferation dangers associated with nuclear power generation are vast and compelling. These proliferation dangers are central to ICAN's mission.

Creating new proliferation risks

ICAN Australia acknowledges and shares the concerns of our partner organisations that nuclear power poses risks of a scale and nature not associated with any other means of producing electricity. These include the risk of accidents and terrorist attack; the long-term environmental and security challenges of keeping huge quantities of highly radioactive waste safe; the environmental and proliferation dangers associated with reprocessing of spent fuel and use of plutonium in reactor fuel; the non-renewable nature of uranium, increased risk of leukemia for children living near even normally-operating nuclear power plants and increased risk of cancer for nuclear industry workers.

A conventional attack on a reactor or spent fuel storage facility could produce more and longer-lived radioactive fallout than a nuclear explosion. Achieving and sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons will require the nuclear fuel chain to be managed very differently in the future. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is based on the assumption that it is possible to separate civilian and military uses of nuclear technology. ICAN Australia has reservations about the validity of this assumption.

Peaceful versus military

Unless much tougher barriers are established between civilian and military nuclear use, it is impossible to guarantee that there is a real barrier between a "peaceful atom" and a "military atom". Fissile materials – highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear disarmament.

The most problematic aspects of the nuclear fuel chain are uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent reactor fuel. Any government which has the material, facilities and expertise to enrich uranium to reactor-grade has everything it needs to enrich uranium further to weapons grade. Plutonium is inevitably produced inside any reactor as uranium atoms absorb neutrons. Plutonium of almost any grade, extracted from spent nuclear fuel, can be used to make nuclear weapons.

Fissile materials add further risks

ICAN Australia believes that fissile materials must be phased out – the NPT Article IV which speaks of the "inalienable right" of states to pursue essentially all aspects of the nuclear fuel chain short of building weapons is not compatible with a nuclear-weapon-free world. ICAN Australia therefore advocates:

  • The United Nations should control all uranium enrichment capacity through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
  • Highly enriched uranium (HEU) should be phased out of civilian uses and naval propulsion altogether
  • Reprocessing of spent fuel to separate plutonium should be stopped and outlawed
  • Stocks of fissile materials should be placed under international control and wherever possible eliminated
  • The IAEA should be given greater resources in order to strengthen nuclear safeguards
  • The promotion of nuclear power should be removed from the IAEA’s mandate
  • Countries should have access to technical assistance with renewable energy technologies.

Uranium mining and exports

Current stockpiles of uranium are sufficient for all medicine, scientific research and industry needs for many millennia to come. Future political and social changes are impossible to judge with certainty. Selling uranium to countries with no current weapons aspirations does not mean that subsequent governments or terrorist organisations will not pose a risk. Decisions on international uranium sales can only be realistically based on the risks inherent in the materials themselves.

While uranium is exported, ICAN Australia advocates placing specific conditions on countries receiving uranium from Australia which significantly reduce the risk of Australian uranium contributing to the production of nuclear weapons. These conditions include:

  • Exclusion of states possessing nuclear weapons
  • Exclusion of states that are either not party to or not compliant with their obligations under the NPT
  • Exclusion of states which have not signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
  • Exclusion of States which do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards and an Additional Protocol in place, with a consistent record of compliance
  • Exclusion of uranium enrichment in facilities not under international control
  • Exclusion of states which reprocess spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium
  • Exclusion of states which do not have excellent standards of nuclear regulation and safety
  • Application of safeguards to all stages of the nuclear fuel chain
  • Exclusion of states which do not have credible provision for safe long-term storage of radioactive waste
  • Regular review and reporting on compliance with the measures outlined above.